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Interview
THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL
WAR
Richards, Leonard L.
Winter 2007
Leonard L. Richards, professor of history at the University of
Massachusetts, took his degrees at the University of California, Berkeley and
Davis. He has also taught at San Francisco State College and the University of
Hawaii. His Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition Mobs in
Jacksonian America won the 1970 American Historical Association's Albert J.
Beveridge Award. The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams was
a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in 1987, and The Slave Power: The Free North
and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 took the second-place 2001 Lincoln Prize.
He lives in Amherst, Massachusetts.
Interview with Leonard L. Richards
Interviewed by Christopher Childers
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): Would you characterize 1850s
California as a southern state or a northern state?
Leonard L. Richards (LLR): It was a free state. By 1860, 47 percent of the 
state's population had northern roots, 40 percent were foreign-born, and only 13 
percent hailed from the slave states, and most of them came from 
nonslaveholding families. Yet despite being a minority, the friends of slavery 
undoubtedly had disproportionate political clout. Why? Patronage played a big 
role. Men like William Gwin made sure that the lion's share of government jobs 
went to southern men. And these men, in turn, became activists in the dominant 
Democratic Party. Nonetheless, even though they controlled the state 
Democratic Party in 1860, they could not deliver the vote for the Southern 
Democratic presidential candidate, John C. Breckinridge. Although he did well 
in California, winning almost 30 percent of the vote, he finished third in the
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field, trailing both northern candidates, Lincoln and Douglas.
CWBR: In the prologue to your book, you recount the duel between
antislavery California senator David Broderick and David S. Terry, chief
justice of the California Supreme Court and a member of the proslavery
Chiv political factionùa battle that personifies the debate between these two
political poles. How did individual personalities influence antebellum
California politics?
LLR: I'm no believer in the great man theory of history. I use David S.
Terry just to tell the story. Only in killing a notable figure did he play a decisive
role. Far more influential were William Gwin and David Broderick. Both were
driven, ruthless, and opportunistic. And both left their mark on the state's
politics. In the case of Gwin, he was typical of most southern leaders, a man of
great wealth who had the means to devote himself full-time to politics.
Broderick, in contrast, was more unique. Even in the age of Lincoln, the sons of
stonemasons seldom rose to the top. They had neither the time nor the
wherewithal to muscle their way up the political ladder. Broderick was the
exception, partly because he was operating in a wide-open society at the right
time, one in which he could make a fortune in just six months, and partly
because of his mastery of Tammany Hall methods and parliamentary procedures.
CWBR: Could southern slaveholders have migrated west and
successfully mined using slave labor or did this idea constitute a fit of fancy
among proslaveryites in an effort to protect and expand the Slave Power?
How seriously did southerners (and northerners) take these plans?
LLR: In 1849, few men North or South knew much about mining, much
less hard-rock mining. Blissfully ignorant, most thought gold mining took no
skill whatsoever, just a pan and a strong back. Accordingly, many slaveholding
politicians believed that gold mining was ideal for slave labor and that the profits
would be huge. The Virginian Henry Wise, among others, imagined his slaves
tripling in value. The Mississippian John Quitman thought the value of all
southern slaves would increase by at least 50 percent. Instead of being worth $2
billion, the value of the South's slave property would shoot up to $3 billion.
Hundreds agreed with him.
By 1851 or 1852, however, panning was no longer profitable. Most of the
easy gold had been taken. Now mining involved high-powered water hoses and
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blasting. Now to get the gold workers had to be entrusted with hoses that could
kill a man at 200 feet, or with black powder. Did attitudes about mining keep up
with the technology? No, attitudes changed slowly.
Could slaves still be used in the mines? Many slave owners undoubtedly had
the capital to buy the necessary equipment. But how many would be willing to
trust their slaves with black powder? Or with lethal hoses? And how many
understood the risks and complexity of underground mining? In the end, some of
the biggest mining corporations decided that no American workers, black or
white, had the necessary skills to do the job. They thus began importing
hard-rock miners from overseas, especially Cornwall.
CWBR: Like so many places in 1850s America, California seemed
ridden with conflict over the slavery issue. Yet in spite of the often
pro-southern political outlook that Senator William Gwin and many
California politicians had, the concept of free labor seems important to
many Californians. How did the Gold Rush and the exodus of white
laborers to the gold fields influence the state's politics?
LLR: California in the 1850s was a strange place. First, it was
overwhelmingly male, and the males came from all over the world. In addition,
most of them were young, in their late teens, twenties, or early thirties. Settling
in some 500 isolated gold camps, these men differed in many ways. But the vast
majority made it clear that they had no desire to compete with slave labor, peon
labor, or corporate labor. They wrote laws to that effect, limiting mining claims
to what one man could work by himself. Men like William Gwin, who visited
the camps to get political support, grasped this fact very quickly. That is why he
seconded the motion to outlaw slavery in California. As he later explained to
John C. Calhoun, he had no choice. He had to do it if he wanted the miners to
support him for the U.S. Senate.
CWBR: Did southerners come to consider the loss of California as a
major turning point in North-South relations"?
LLR: Yes. In the eyes of most Southern leaders, especially Southern 
Democrats, the admission of California as a free state was a disaster. It meant 
that the number of free states now outnumbered the number of slave states, 16 to 
15. It also meant that someday the slaveholding South might lose control of the 
Senate. That did not happen immediately, thanks to the election, first, of William
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Gwin, and then, of John Weller. But what about the future? Just the thought of
two free-soilers sitting in the Senate haunted men like Jefferson Davis, James
Gadsden, and John Quitman.
CWBR: The change in political mood against the proslavery Chiv
faction following the Terry-Broderick duel and during the secession crisis
seems swift and decisive. What other factors contributed to the rise of
unionism in the state?
LLR: Despite the power of men like William Gwin, the state in 1860 was
overwhelmingly northern. Men from the Deep South totaled about 6 percent of
the population, and men from the border slave states totaled about 7 percent. In
contrast, about 47 percent of the state's population had northern roots. While
these northern men might have been indifferent to much of the political fanfare
of the 1850sùthe Fugitive Slave Act, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, etc.ùthey were
not indifferent to what happened in 1861. They knew that the Confederacy fired
the first shot.
CWBR: You discuss the role of California and its people in the Union
during the Civil War and argue that while the state provided little
manpower to the war effort, the infusion of California gold into the Union
treasury benefited the war effort. Had politicians in both the North and
South ever anticipated this contribution?
LLR: They did, but seldom spoke about it. They probably saw no need to.
Rightly or wrongly, virtually everyone assumed that gold was money, that it had
a huge impact on the world's currency and on the nation's measured wealth, and
that whoever had it had the whip hand. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels said as
much. So did scores of others. In 1848, in emphasizing the importance of the
gold discovery, the top military brass in California, Colonel Richard Mason and
his aide Lieutenant William Tecumseh Sherman, pointed out to President James
K. Polk that California gold would pay the cost of the war with Mexico a
hundred times over. Polk, in turn, made much of their report in his annual
message to Congress, repeatedly emphasizing the abundance of gold and
predicting that California and the other territories taken from Mexico would add
more to the strength and wealth of the nation than any previous acquisitions.
Some doubted this, but thousands of Polk's countrymen voted with their feet and
headed west.
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CWBR: Thank you.
Photo of Leonard L. Richards by Theresa Richards
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